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Abstract 
Psychological essentialism is a worldview in which social categories are mistakenly identified as 
having a fixed, naturally occurring, and homogenous nature inherent to them (Haslam, 1998; 
Rothbart & Taylor, 1992). Furthermore, essentialist cognitions are believed to be composed of 
two independent factors – beliefs that social groups are naturally occurring, fixed, and 
unchanging (i.e., natural kinds beliefs) and beliefs that the group is homogenous and inherently 
distinct from other groups (i.e., entitative beliefs). Previous research has demonstrated that 
individuals with stronger essentialist beliefs toward social classes (e.g., race, sexual orientation, 
mental illness) tend to exhibit more prejudice against these groups (Haqanee, Lou, & Lalonde, 
2014; Haslam & Levy, 2006; Verkuyten, 2003). The current study aimed to further clarify 
essentialist cognitive frameworks toward mental illness by examining the efficacy of essentialist-
inconsistent educational interventions on stigma reduction. More specifically, 62 participants 
were recruited to participate in a study to ostensibly review a mental illness informational 
pamphlet. Participants completed an initial series of measures assessing their attitudes toward 
schizophrenia, and were assigned one of three informational pamphlets (correcting entitative 
beliefs, natural kinds beliefs, or neither) during a follow-up session. It was predicted that 
participants assigned to the entitative belief condition would show significantly greater 
reductions in mental illness stigma, compared to the participants in both the natural kinds and 
 control conditions. Contrary to this prediction, participants in the control condition tended to 
show the greatest reduction in mental illness stigma, particularly involving beliefs about the 
dangerousness of individuals with schizophrenia. The present study also examined the 
malleability of essentialist beliefs (i.e., whether exposure to written material would be sufficient 
in lowering essentialist beliefs). Participant endorsement of both natural kinds and entitative 
beliefs of schizophrenia showed significant reductions, independent of the intervention condition 
to which they were assigned. Results and future directions are discussed. 
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Modifying Essentialist Beliefs Toward Mental Illness: An Alternative Focus for Anti-Stigma 
Interventions 
 Social stigma is the devaluation and dehumanization of a person or group of people based 
on shared characteristics that separate them from other members of society (Crocker & Quinn, 
2003; Goffman, 1963). The presence of social stigma has far-reaching consequences on the lives 
of persons with mental health issues. For example, mental illness stigmatization has been shown 
to cause detrimental effects in the workplace, resulting in fewer promotions, job offers, and less 
friendly behavior from both supervisors and co-workers (Corrigan, 2007; Farina & Felner, 1973; 
Hinshaw & Cicchetti, 2000). Link, Struening, Neese-Todd, Asmussen and Phelan (2001) have 
found that individuals with mental illnesses who were exposed to negative stigma have shown 
significant decreases in self-esteem. Additionally, stigma has been linked to exacerbated 
symptomatology via increased depression and pessimism (Link, 1987; Ritsher, Otilingam, & 
Grajales, 2003; Sibitz et al., 2011). Sirey et al. (2001) have found that increased perceptions of 
stigmatization among mental health clients has been linked to higher non-compliance rates as 
measured by both treatment attendance and medication adherence. Mental health clients with 
particularly stigmatized disorders (e.g. schizophrenia, bipolar disorder) report that the stigma 
they face is worse than the illness itself (Lincoln, Arens, Berger, & Rief, 2008). 
 Stigma arises from the connection of negative, biased stereotypes to those characteristics 
that distinguish individuals from other members of society. Print and televised news outlets often 
depict mental illness in a violent and dangerous content (Cross, 2004; Magli, Buizza, & Pioli, 
2004; McGinty, Webster, & Barry, 2013). Televised media, in particular, can also model negative 
reactions to mental illness by promoting fear, rejection and misunderstanding (Stuart, 2006). 
These unflattering portrayals may lead to an inaccurate understanding of mental illness among 
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the lay public. In addition, Hiday (1995) suggests that social factors typically associated with 
mental illness (e.g., substance abuse, poverty, and exposure to violence) may be more strongly 
associated with violence than the presence of the mental illness per se.  
 The frequency of these stereotyped messages strengthen the specious link between 
bizarre, dangerous, and aggressive behaviors to mental illness. For example, Link (1987) found 
in his sample of participants with psychiatric symptoms that those who were labeled mentally ill 
experienced demoralization from the community, even in the absence of dangerous or aberrant 
behavior. This may, in part, be due to the fact that the term “mental illness” brings to mind a 
distinct, homogenous group among lay public members. This “groupness”, otherwise referred to 
as entitativity, is the extent to which a group of people is considered a meaningful unit with deep 
commonalities (Campbell, 1958), and is theorized to be a component of a broader cognitive bias 
termed essentialist beliefs. 
Essentialist Beliefs 
 Psychological essentialism is a cognitive bias in which certain social categories are 
misunderstood as having a fixed, underlying and homogenous nature, and certain categories are 
more natural than others (Haslam, 1998). Allport (1954) suggested that this rigid, essentialized 
mindset was the basis for prejudiced attitudes. Indeed, essentialist beliefs have been shown to 
moderate thinking about various groups of people, including ethnic minorities (Gil-White, 2001), 
race (Verkuyten, 2003), sexual orientation (Haslam & Levy, 2006) and personality (Haslam, 
Bastian, & Bissett, 2004). Rothbart and Taylor (1992) developed a fundamental theory 
suggesting that essentialism involves a misunderstanding of social categories as “natural kinds,” 
i.e. groups that develop through historical and social contexts are misrepresented as biological 
categories or species. They further speculated that natural kinds beliefs are comprised of two 
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sub-beliefs: that members of essential categories cannot lose their membership in that category 
(immutability), and that the essential category allows individuals to induce qualities that 
members of that category share (inductive potential). For example, an individual maintaining an 
essentialist belief toward a schizophrenic would subsequently endorse the beliefs that 
schizophrenia is incurable, and that aspects of the schizophrenic's identity could be inferred 
based on the inclusion in the “schizophrenia” group. 
 Further research by Haslam, Rothschild, and Ernst (2000) has demonstrated a two-factor 
model of essentialist thinking that elucidates the Rothbart and Taylor model. The first factor, 
natural kinds, combines beliefs of immutability, biological basis, discreteness, historical 
invariance and defining features of a category. The second factor, entitativity, is composed of 
beliefs that a category has an underlying, inherent basis, is homogenous, and offers inductive 
potential about category members. Subsequent research has provided empirical support on the 
validity of the two-factor model with a variety of social categories, including race, gender, sexual 
orientation, and mental illness (Haqanee, Lou, & Lalonde, 2014; Haslam & Ernst, 2002; Haslam 
& Levy, 2006; Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 2002). 
Essentialist Beliefs and Mental Illness Stigma 
 Research has demonstrated that the degree of entitativity and natural kinds belief 
individuals hold toward a certain group affect their prejudice toward that group. For example, 
Haslam, Rothschild, and Ernst (2000, 2002) have found that entitativity self-report ratings were 
negatively correlated with evaluations of various social groups, including evaluations directed 
toward those with mental illness. Similarly, Phelan (2005) has shown that when participants were 
provided vignettes that portray mental illness as being caused by genetics (i.e., natural kinds), 
participants reported an increased desire for social distance. Finally, sexual, gender, and racial 
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groups that are subject to prejudice (e.g. homosexuals, women, and Jews) were rated higher than 
control groups (e.g. heterosexuals, males, and Christians) on at least one essentialist factor 
(Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 2000). 
 These findings have also been supported in mental illness stigma research. Haqanee, Lou, 
and Lalonde (2014) found that entitativity beliefs are a significant predictor of prejudice toward 
schizophrenia, over and above predictions based on previous contact and natural kinds beliefs. 
Similarly, Phelan (2005) exposed participants to vignettes that depicted schizophrenia or 
depression as either genetically caused (i.e. providing support for natural kinds) or not. 
Participants who were led to believe that the mental illnesses had a genetic component showed a 
stronger desire for social distance than those that did not receive the manipulation. These same 
genetic causal attributions of mental illness have also been linked to poor prognosis of treatment 
and more recommendations for mental hospitalizations (Phelan, Yang, & Cruz-Rojas, 2006). 
Anti-stigma Interventions 
 Many anti-stigma interventions have been based on the “medical model” of mental illness 
(Guze, 1992; Laing, 1971), which suggests that “mental illness is an illness just like any other.” 
These interventions have been implemented in various countries (Becker & Vazquez-Barqureo, 
2001; Crisp, 2000; Sartorius, 1997). However, the lay public has largely rejected this model of 
intervention (Angermeyer & Dietrich, 2006; Read, Haslam, Sayce, & Davies, 2006). 
Additionally, public health researchers have called the medical model into question (Albee & 
Joffe, 2004; Luchins, 2004; Schnitker, 2008). Despite the lack of reduction in stigmatic attitudes, 
anti-stigma interventions have been shown to modify or otherwise change the ways in which the 
lay public conceptualizes mental illness (Angermeyer & Dietrich, 2006). For example, a meta-
analysis of national representative population samples by Schomerus et al. (2012) has shown that 
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over time, the public has become increasingly more knowledgeable of biomedical models of 
mental illness. 
 By suggesting that mental illness is attributable to medical causes, researchers argue, lay 
people have been led to believe that individuals with mental illnesses have no control over their 
thoughts or behaviors (Read, Haslam, Sayce, & Davies, 2006). This hypothesis may explain why 
attitudes toward the mentally ill have not improved despite these interventions (Green, 
McCormick, Walkey, & Taylor, 1987; Trute, Tefft, & Segall, 1989). Indeed, information 
attributing biological causes to mental illness has been found to increase perceptions of 
dangerousness (Lam, Salkovskis, & Warwick, 2005) and unpredictability (Read & Law, 1999). 
Other psychoeducational interventions, focusing on educating the public about severe 
mental illness and correcting existing myths on mental illness, have been more successful at 
improving attitudes toward mental illness (Holmes, Corrigan, Williams, Canar, & Kubiak, 1999; 
Morrison, Cocozza, & Vanderwyst, 1980; Penn, Kommana, Mansfield, & Link, 1999). Although 
longer (i.e. semester-long) courses tend to have larger effect sizes, even brief information 
sessions have shown to result in significant reductions in stigmatization (Thornton & Wahl, 
1996).  
The Present Research 
As evidenced by previous research, stigma and prejudice toward schizophrenia may be 
predicted by the degree to which an individual holds entitative beliefs about the disorder 
(Haqanee, Lou, & Lalonde, 2014). However, certain natural kinds beliefs (most notably, 
naturalness) have also been shown to influence attitudes toward mental illness (Phelan, 2005; 
Phelan, Yang, Cruz-Rojas, 2006).  As of yet, however, there is a dearth of research evidence 
exploring the relative strengths of entitative and natural kinds beliefs in predicting mental illness 
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stigmatization. The present research sought to clarify the effects of manipulating entitative 
beliefs and natural kinds beliefs on stigma toward a specific mental disorder (schizophrenia). 
More specifically, manipulation of essentialist beliefs was conducted using a brief mental illness 
informational brochure. This method of education is a particularly attractive one, given the ease 
of delivery to the population, and the relatively low costs associated with implementation and 
delivery. Furthermore, pamphlet interventions are already in frequent use, and have been found 
to significantly influence public attitudes of general medical health issues (Huttner, Goossens, 
Verheij, & Harbath, 2010) and psychological issues (Hammer & Vogel, 2010). 
The present research consisted of an experiment in which participants reported pre-
existing stigmatizing attitudes regarding schizophrenia. Participants then read informational 
pamphlets contradicting essentialist beliefs, and again rated their stigma beliefs about 
schizophrenia, allowing for assessment of attitude change as a result of exposure to essentialism-
inconsistent information. Because essentialism has been shown to be related to stigmatic beliefs 
across a variety of prejudiced groups (Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 2000), I hypothesized that 
participant self-report of stigma would be significantly reduced following exposure to the 
essentialism-inconsistent pamphlets. Furthermore, the present study utilized two separate 
intervention pamphlets, addressing either entitative or natural kinds beliefs, allowing for a more 
nuanced understanding of the role that each belief type plays on mental illness stigmatization. 
The design of the present research also allowed for a replication and expanded 
understanding of previous research by demonstrating the associations between essentialist beliefs 
and stigma. On the basis of previous research by Haqanee, Lou, & Lalonde (2014), I 
hypothesized that stigma towards the mentally ill is more strongly predicted by entitative beliefs 
than natural kinds beliefs. Furthermore, I hypothesized that an individual's natural kinds beliefs 
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would correlate with an endorsement of genetic causal attributions for schizophrenia. In 
particular, examining this relationship in the context of a mental illness pamphlet could further 
elucidate the degree to which presentation of essentialism-inconsistent information could change 
an individual’s preexisting beliefs about mental illness. 
 
Method 
Participants and Design 
 Sixty-two Introductory Psychology students (46 female, 16 male; Mage = 18.85 years, SD 
= 1.84 years, range: 18-28 years) from a small-sized southern university were recruited to 
participate in the present study in exchange for partial fulfillment of their research credit in a 
psychology course. In some instances, per course instructor discretion, students were offered 
extra credit in lieu of research credit fulfillment. The study employed a 3(anti-stigma 
intervention: entitative beliefs vs. natural kinds beliefs vs. control) x 2(time: pre-test vs. post-
test) mixed design with the latter factor assessed as within subjects.  
Procedure 
 Participants first provided consent by signing an informed consent form (Appendix A), 
which was subsequently stored in a secure location to ensure confidentiality and anonymity. As 
part of the consent process, participants were told that they would be taking part in a pilot study 
examining the effectiveness of a new mental illness information pamphlet that would be 
distributed at the university counseling center. Participants were informed prior to the initial 
session that the study would require them to return at a later date to evaluate the pamphlet. 
Participants then completed a demographics questionnaire (Appendix B) and read a short 
informational briefing regarding schizophrenia (Appendix C). This briefing listed the primary 
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symptoms of schizophrenia in non-technical terms, consistent with the DSM-IV diagnostic 
criteria (American Psychiatric Association, 1994), and contained paraphrased information from 
an undergraduate level textbook (Weiten, Dunn, & Hammer, 2012). 
 Essentialist beliefs. A primary focus of this study was to examine the malleability of 
essentialist beliefs following exposure to anti-stigma interventions that challenge those 
essentialist beliefs. Haslam and Levy (2006) developed a scale measuring essentialist beliefs for 
use with homosexuality, similar to one used by Haslam and Ernst (2002) in their study of 
essentialist beliefs toward mental illness, but including measures adapted from Hegarty and 
Pratto (2001) measuring the biological basis, fixity, and cross-cultural universality. Both the scale 
used by Haslam and Levy (2006) and the one used by Haslam and Ernst (2002) were combined 
in the present study to explore a broader understanding of essentialism (Appendix D). 
Additionally, an item used by Haqanee, Lou, and Lalonde (2014) was included to explore the 
entitativity belief of exclusivity. This scale was then separated into two subscales measuring 
entitativity (four items, e.g., “Schizophrenia is a category that is exclusive; such a category does 
not allow a person to belong to other categories”), and natural kinds beliefs (seven items, e.g., 
“Schizophrenia is caused by biological factors, such as genes or hormones”), given the theorized 
two-factor theory of essentialist beliefs (Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 2002). A third set of non-
essentialist stigma items were included to examine belief change among control participants. 
Participants responded to the items using a five-point Likert scale with anchors at 1 (Very 
strongly disagree) and 5 (Very strongly agree). 
This scale was used as a manipulation check to determine whether participants' 
essentialist beliefs toward mental illness had changed, and was administered at two time points: 
the initial session and following participant exposure to the anti-stigma pamphlet. Responses 
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were then coded and averaged across each subscale to create three composite scales such that 
higher numbers reflect greater entitative, natural kinds, and general stigma beliefs. Reliability 
scores for the entitativity items pre-intervention was poor (Cronbach’s alpha = .59), and 
unacceptable for both the natural kinds items (α = .27) and control items (α = .27). Post-
intervention reliability scores were acceptable for the entitativity items (α = .63), but similarly 
unacceptable for both the natural kinds items (α = -.05; the negative reliability score suggesting 
weak correlations between items) and control items (α = .31). Therefore, a single item, 
mutability (“A schizophrenic individual can become mentally healthy or completely cured.”) was 
chosen to best represent the natural kinds belief. This item was chosen because it was directly 
addressed in the natural kinds education condition, and it has previously been shown to be more 
strongly related to change in other natural kinds essentialist beliefs (Haslam & Ernst, 2002). One 
participant failed to answer the mutability item during the second session (i.e., after receiving the 
mental illness pamphlet). Therefore, this participant has been excluded from all manipulation 
check analyses. Given the low reliability ratings for the entitativity belief items, interpretations 
of analyses involving entitativity beliefs should be made cautiously. 
 Stigma measures. Because mental illness stigma is a multifaceted concept of both 
stereotyped beliefs and prejudicial feelings (Rusch, Angermeyer, & Corrigan, 2005), several 
measures were utilized to capture a broader picture of stigma. One of the most common 
measures of stigma used in the literature is the desire for social distance (Angermeyer et al., 
2011; Jorm & Oh, 2009), or an individual’s willingness to engage in contact with a member of 
another group in various social contexts. The social distance measure used in this study 
(Appendix E) was adapted from one used by Link, Cullen, Frank, and Wozniak (1987) , which in 
turn is a modified version of the Bogardus Social Distance Scale (Bogardus, 1925). It consisted 
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of seven items representing various degrees of social relationships. Using a five-point Likert 
scale with anchors at 1 (in no case at all) to 5 (in any case), participants indicated the extent to 
which they would accept a schizophrenic individual in each social relationship. Responses were 
then reverse-coded, so that higher scores indicate a greater desire for social distance, implying 
higher levels of prejudice. A second measure of stigma used in the present study (Appendix F), 
measuring participant perceptions of dangerousness and dependency, was developed by 
Angermeyer, Matschinger, and Corrigan (2004). This instrument listed eight personality 
characteristics depicting dangerousness (i.e. “dangerous,” “unpredictable,” “lacking self-
control,” “aggressive,” and “frightening) and dependency (i.e. “dependent upon others,” 
“helpless,” and “needy”). Participants indicated their beliefs regarding how dangerous and 
dependent upon others schizophrenic individuals are, using a seven-point Likert scale with 
anchors at 1 (definitely not true) to 7 (definitely true). Responses were then averaged to create 
aggregate measures of dangerousness and dependence beliefs. The items for the dangerousness 
scale were found to maintain good internal consistency, α = .85, while the items used in the 
dependence measure were also acceptably reliable, α = .67. These reliability coefficients are 
similar to the Cronbach’s alpha of .88 reported in the original study (reliability of the dependency 
scale was not reported).  
Following completion of these measures, participants were thanked for their time, 
provided research credit, and asked to return in two weeks to complete the second part of the 
study. 
 Anti-stigma interventions. Upon return to the second part of the study, participants were 
randomly assigned to one of three anti-stigma interventions (Appendix H), exposing them to 
information inconsistent with entitativity beliefs (n = 20), natural kinds beliefs (n = 21), or a non-
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essentialist control condition (n = 21). The interventions were designed such that sections of the 
pamphlets directly corresponded with items from the essentialist belief measure (Appendix D); 
such items are designated by an asterisk (*). Participants were told that these pamphlets were 
intended for distribution at the university counseling center, and that the study was focused on 
evaluating the effectiveness of the pamphlet, in an effort to minimize the effects of social 
desirability effects. These psychoeducational pamphlets were kept as similar to one another as 
possible, only differing for the purposes of manipulating the type of essentialist belief. To further 
disguise the purpose of the study, participants were asked to rate various aspects of the pamphlet, 
including readability and design (Appendix I). 
 Social dominance orientation (SDO). Social dominance orientation reflects an 
individual's attitude toward intergroup relationships, and whether they idealize these relations to 
be equal or hierarchical. High-SDO individuals prefer social groups that are organized by 
superiority, while low-SDO individuals prefer a socialist, equal organization. SDO has been 
found to predict prejudice toward individuals with mental illness, and controlling for SDO has 
previously elicited stronger correlations between essentialist beliefs and mental illness stigma 
(Bizer, Hart, & Jekogian, 2012; Haqanee, Lou, & Lalonde, 2014). Therefore, I have included a 
15-item measure by Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth and Malle (1994) that has been used previously 
in mental illness stigma research (Appendix J). Participants were asked to read a number of 
statements pertaining to intergroup relationships (e.g., “To get ahead in life, it is sometimes 
necessary to step on other groups”) and asked to report their agreement with the statement using 
a 7-point Likert scale with anchors of 1 (very negative) and 7 (very positive). Seven items 
reflected statements that indicated equivalent intergroup relations (e.g., “Group equality should 
be our ideal”) and were subsequently reverse-coded. Reliability analyses revealed that the 
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responses maintained good internal consistency with one another, α = .89. Items were then 
averaged together to create a mean social dominance score, such that higher numbers indicated a 
stronger desire for social dominance. 
 Social desirability. Given that participants may have been motivated to minimize their 
prejudicial attitudes toward mental illness, the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale was 
included in the study to assess for response bias (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960; Appendix K). This 
33-item measure evaluates the extent to which a participant’s responses may be a reflection of 
their desire to appear politically correct, rather than an accurate representation of their own 
beliefs. Participants were asked to read statements (e.g., “I like to gossip at times”) and report 
whether they felt the statement pertained to them personally by using true or false responses. 
Reponses were then coded such that responses consistent with high social desirability were 
scored as a 1, while non-socially desirable responses were scored as a 0. The coded responses 
were found to maintain acceptable internal reliability, α = .70. The responses were then summed 
for each participant, creating a composite score in which higher values represented a stronger 
tendency toward socially desirable responses. 
 Causal Attributions. In order to test the hypothesis that natural kinds beliefs of mental 
illness are associated with the belief that mental illness is caused by biogenetic factors, 
participants were administered a 9-item measure assessing their attributions for the causes of 
mental illness (Jorm, et al., 1997; Appendix G). Participants were asked to read statements 
portraying possible causes of mental illness (e.g., “The recent death of a close friend or relative”) 
and asked to report how likely each was to result in schizophrenia using a 5-point Likert scale 
with anchors of 1 (very unlikely) and 7 (very likely). Though the entire measure was included for 
the sake of posterity, only the item directly assessing biogenetic causes, “Genetics or inherited,” 
  13 
was used in the present analyses.  
Post-test measures. Participants were then reassessed using the essentialist beliefs 
measure (Appendix D), both as a manipulations check and to measure the degree to which 
essentialist beliefs may have globally decreased as a result of psychoeducation rather than the 
specifically targeted entitativity and natural kinds interventions. Participants were also 
reevaluated on the social distance, dangerousness and dependence stigma measures (Appendices 
E and F) following exposure to the anti-stigma interventions, in order to measure the degree to 
which the various interventions decreased stigma. In order to disguise the purpose of study, 
participants were told that some of the data taken during the first session were lost due to a 
computer error, and therefore would need to be recollected. Finally, participants were provided a 
debriefing statement (Appendix L), including an explanation of the deception used in the 
research and the necessity of the use of deception, provided a second research credit, and 
thanked for their time. 
Results 
Manipulation Check 
 To evaluate whether the manipulation had the intended effect of influencing the targeted 
belief, a 2 (time: pre vs. post) x 2 (belief type: entitative vs. natural kinds) by 3 (anti-stigma 
intervention: entitative beliefs vs. natural kinds beliefs vs. control) mixed design ANOVA was 
conducted with time and belief type as the within-subjects factor and intervention as the 
between-subjects factor. Mean and standard deviation values are provided in Table 1. There was 
a significant main effect of time, F(1, 58) = 14.88, p < .001, ηp2 = .20, as well as a significant 
main effect of belief type, F(1, 58) = 46.81, p < .001, ηp2 = .45. A marginally significant Belief 
Type x Intervention two-way interaction was also found, F(2, 58) = 2.90, p = .063, ηp2 = .09. 
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Contrary to prior expectations, there was no significant three-way time x belief type x 
intervention, F(2, 58) = 1.97, p = .148, ηp2 = .06, suggesting that changes in participant beliefs 
over time did not depend upon the condition to which they were assigned.  
Stigma Measures 
 Social Distance. A 2 (time) x 3 (intervention) mixed-design ANOVA with time as the 
within-subjects variable and intervention as the between-subjects variable was run on the 
measure of social distance to determine how social distance varied as a function of pamphlet 
exposure. A significant main effect of time emerged, F(1, 59) = 11.96, p = .001, ηp2 = .17, Mpre = 
3.05, SD = 0.89, Mpost = 2.81, SD = 0.89. The predicted time x intervention interaction was not 
significant, F(2, 59) = 1.46, p = .240, ηp2 = .05 (see Figure 1). 
 Dangerousness. A second 2 x 3 mixed-design ANOVA, with the same independent 
variables and dangerousness as the dependent variable, revealed a significant main effect of time, 
F(1, 59) = 32.80, p < .001, ηp2 = .36. However, this main effect was qualified by a significant 
time by intervention interaction effect, F(2, 59) = 3.18, p = .049, ηp2 = .10 (see Figure 2). Follow-
up simple effects analyses using a pooled error term revealed that among participants exposed to 
the entitativity pamphlet, perceptions of dangerousness decreased from Mpre = 4.14 to Mpost = 
3.64 (SDs = 1.13 and 0.97, respectively). However, this difference did not reach conventional 
levels of significance, F(1, 59) = 3.39, p = .071, MSE = 0.74, ηp2 = .05. Among participants who 
received the natural kinds pamphlets, perceptions of dangerousness significantly decreased from 
Mpre = 3.97 (SD = 1.44) prior to reading the pamphlet to Mpost = 3.24 (SD = .87) after reading the 
pamphlet, F(1, 59) = 7.66, p = .008, ηp2 = .12. Participants in the control condition also 
experienced a significant reduction in perceptions of dangerousness, F(1, 59) = 28.59, p < .001, 
ηp
2 
= .33, Mpre = 4.80, SDpre = 1.21, Mpost = 3.38, SDpost = 1.03 (see Figure 3). 
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 Dependence. A final 2 x 3 mixed design ANOVA was conducted using the average 
response on the dependence measure as the dependent variable. Participant perceptions of the 
dependence of schizophrenic individuals significantly decreased from baseline levels (M = 3.44, 
SD = 1.08) to their scores after reading the pamphlets (M = 3.10, SD = 1.20), F(1, 59) = 4.60, p = 
.036, ηp2 = .07. The results also revealed a marginally significant time by intervention interaction 
effect, F (2, 59) = 3.05, p = .055, ηp2 = .09. Although the interaction did not reach conventional 
levels of significance, follow-up simple effects analysis with a pooled error term were conducted 
to assess the trend of the relationship between essentialism and stigma. Participants who were 
assigned to the control condition experienced a significant decrease in their perceptions of the 
dependence of individuals with schizophrenia, F(1, 59) = 9.38, p = .003, MSE = 0.73, ηp2 = .14, 
Mpre = 4.00, SDpre = 0.90, Mpost = 3.19, SDpost = 1.27. In contrast, participants in the entitative 
condition did not subsequently show significant reductions in perceptions of dependence, F(1, 
59) = 1.16, p = .286, ηp2 = .02. Participants in the natural kinds condition also failed to show a 
significant reduction in perceptions of dependence, F(1, 59) = 0.18, p = .676, ηp2 = .003. 
 Given the lack of a significant three-way time x belief type x intervention interaction in 
the manipulations check analyses, exploratory correlational analyses were conducted between 
participant evaluations of beliefs of dependence and their adherence to essentialist beliefs of 
schizophrenia, since changes in essentialist beliefs across time were unrelated to the condition to 
which participants were assigned. The correlational analyses did not indicate a significant 
relationship between participant perceptions of dependence post-intervention and participant’s 
natural kinds beliefs of schizophrenia post-intervention, r(59) = .18, p = .168. Similarly, 
perceptions of dependence were not significantly associated with post-intervention entitative 
beliefs, r(60) = .22, p = .090. However, natural kinds beliefs post-intervention were found to be 
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significantly correlated with desire for social distance post-intervention, r(59) = .35, p = .006. No 
other significant correlations between essentialist beliefs and stigmatic beliefs after exposure to 
the informational pamphlet were found (rs < |.19|, ps > .167).  Further exploratory analyses 
revealed that natural kinds beliefs pre-intervention were also significantly associated with desire 
for social distance pre-intervention, r(60) = .40, p = .001. No other significant correlations 
between essentialist beliefs and stigmatic beliefs prior to exposure to the informational pamphlet 
were found (rs < |.26|, ps > .050). 
Natural Kinds Beliefs and Causal Attributions 
 On the basis of previous research examining the relationship between endorsements of 
biogenetic causes of mental illness (as measured post-intervention) as predictive of mental illness 
stigma, Pearson bivariate correlational analyses were conducted to explore whether participant 
post-intervention beliefs that mental illness is caused by genetic factors might be related to a 
stronger desire for social distance, or stronger endorsements of the beliefs that individuals with 
schizophrenia are more dangerous or dependent upon others post-intervention. One participant 
had failed to answer the genetic causal attribution item, and was therefore excluded from the 
correlational analyses. The correlations between these variables were non-significant (rs < |.15|, 
ps > .278).  Similarly, post-intervention beliefs that mental illness is caused by genetic factors 
was not significantly associated with pre-intervention stigma measures (rs < |.23|, ps > .080). 
However, genetic causal attributions were significantly and negatively related to the difference in 
perceived dependence pre-intervention and post-intervention, r(59) = -.33, p = .010. 
 Subsequently, correlational analyses were conducted to assess whether participant 
endorsement of biogenetic causes of schizophrenia were associated with either entitative or 
natural kinds beliefs, both before and after the informational intervention. As predicted, neither 
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entitative beliefs pre- or post-intervention were significantly correlated with biogenetic 
attributions (rs = -.08 and -.04, ps = .544 and .750, respectively). Contrary to predictions, 
biogenetic causal attributions were also not significantly associated with natural kinds beliefs 
pre- or post-intervention, (rs = -.02 and .19, ps = .884 and .147, respectively). 
Potential Covariates 
 Pearson bivariate correlational analyses were conducted to explore the relationship 
between participant social desirability scores and their responses on the three primary prejudice 
measures (desire for social distance, perceptions of dangerousness, and perceptions of 
dependence upon others), both prior to and following the intervention, as well as the difference 
in scores from pre- to post-intervention. However, social desirability was not significantly 
associated with the measures (rs < |.14|, ps > .28) and therefore were not included as a covariate 
in the ANOVAs. 
 Social dominance orientation, however, was significantly correlated with several 
individual dependent variables, including participant desire for social distance prior to receiving 
the information pamphlets (r(60) = .29, p = .021), as well as desire for social distance after 
reading the information pamphlets (r(60) = .39, p = .002), perceptions of dangerousness after 
receiving the pamphlets (r(60) = .35, p = .005), and perceptions of dependence after reading the 
pamphlets (r(60) = .37, p = .003). However, social dominance was not significantly correlated 
with the differences in these scores between pre- and post-intervention (rs < |.18|, ps > .10), thus 
precluding the inclusion of SDO as a covariate in the repeated measures ANOVAs. 
Discussion 
Stigma Reduction 
 A primary goal of the present research was to examine methods by which levels of 
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prejudice towards the mentally ill might be lessened. Public opinions towards the mentally ill 
have been linked to the care and management of mental illness, including the afflicted 
individual’s degree of embarrassment toward seeking treatment (Greene-Shortridge, Britt, & 
Castro, 2007), self-management of mental illness symptomatology (Sirey et al, 2001), and the 
implementation of public policy intended to increase funding and support to aid those with 
mental illness (Pescosolido et al., 2010). As such, decreasing prejudice represents a fertile 
avenue by which to effect change, both at the institutional and individual levels. In the present 
study, participants were provided with informational pamphlets on schizophrenia intended to 
lessen the degree of stereotyping through the use of psychoeducation. Importantly, the pamphlets 
were not intended to alter perceptions of schizophrenia by presenting the disorder as an illness 
like any other, due to the general inefficacy of this model of intervention demonstrated by the 
extent literature (Albee & Joffe, 2004; Read, Haslam, Sayce, & Davies, 2006; Schnitker, 2008). 
Rather, the intervention used in the present study rectified common misconceptions of 
schizophrenia. The results suggest that participant perceptions of social distance significantly 
decreased over time when averaged across intervention conditions. However, sans inclusion of a 
control condition with no information about schizophrenia, it is impossible to determine whether 
this decrease in stigmatic attitudes was due to the pamphlet intervention. Although previous 
research has demonstrated that brief written informational interventions can effectively reduce 
prejudice towards mental illness (Thornton & Wahl, 1996), the same can not be assumed in the 
present study. 
The Role of Essentialism in Mental Illness Stigma 
 A second purpose of the current study was to evaluate the association between 
essentialism and mental illness stigma as a potential avenue for reducing prejudiced beliefs. 
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Towards this aim, sections of the intervention pamphlet were devoted to either correcting myths 
associated with entitative beliefs or natural kinds beliefs associated with schizophrenia. 
Participants were then randomly assigned one of the intervention pamphlets to assess the degree 
to which these two factors of essentialism might be changed as a result of exposure to the 
educational intervention. Intriguingly, although the degree to which participants essentialized 
schizophrenia decreased overall, the type of belief change did not depend upon the intervention 
to which they were assigned. In other words, participants experienced decreases in entitative and 
natural kinds beliefs of schizophrenia, but these decreases did not differ as a function of the 
pamphlet the participant read. This finding is especially puzzling given the support for the 
independence of the entitative and natural kinds constructs (Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 2000). 
One possibility is that the relationship between essentialism and stigma may be bi-directional; 
that is, just as reducing essentialist thinking reduces prejudice towards mental illness, so too 
might lowered prejudice result in lessened essentialized attitudes. As an alternative explanation, 
it is possible that sections of the intervention unrelated to the essentialism manipulation (i.e., 
aspects of the pamphlet that were kept constant across conditions) may have had the unintended 
effect of decreasing entitative and natural kinds beliefs. Though it is not distinctly obvious where 
such a manipulation might be occurring, it is plausible that a number of the statements may be 
working to implicitly decrease levels of essentialist beliefs among participants. 
 Among specific measures of mental illness stigma, it was found that individuals assigned 
to the natural kinds manipulation showed a significant decrease in perceived dangerousness of 
individuals with schizophrenia, while those assigned to the entitative condition did not show 
such a change. Additionally, participants assigned to the control condition also changed their 
beliefs about the danger that schizophrenic individuals represent to society. Previous research has 
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shown that schizophrenia is considered by the lay public to be a dangerous disorder (Angermeyer 
& Matschinger, 2003). Simultaneously, attitudes toward schizophrenia seem to be heavily rooted 
in both natural kinds beliefs and entitative beliefs (Haqanee, Lou, & Lalonde, 2014). Given the 
pattern of changes in perceptions of dangerousness observed in the present study, it is feasible 
that participant beliefs that schizophrenia is a dangerous disorder is linked to beliefs that the 
immutability and discreteness of the disorder. Furthermore, this finding contradicts those of 
Haqanee, Lou, and Lalonde (2014), who suggested that prejudice towards schizophrenia is more 
strongly predicted by entitativity beliefs. These apparently contradictory findings between the 
present study and extent literature suggest that stigma towards schizophrenia (and likely, mental 
illness in general) is borne of complex origins, and the relationship between essentialist beliefs 
and stigma is likely more nuanced than initially thought. 
 When evaluating stigma via perceptions of dependence, testing of differences across the 
three conditions only resulted in marginally significant differences. However, simple effects 
comparisons based upon a priori hypotheses revealed that neither entitative nor natural kinds 
beliefs seemed to be associated with reductions in perceptions of dependence. The observed data 
trend suggests that the two factors of essentialist beliefs are relatively independent constructs 
from the perceived dependency of individuals with schizophrenia, and that there is an unexplored 
construct (or set of constructs) that drives the belief that individuals with schizophrenia present 
some sort of societal burden.  
The finding that natural kinds beliefs and genetic causal attributions were not 
significantly associated with each other is an intriguing one, especially given that natural kinds 
beliefs were assessed by examining participant beliefs of immutability. Previous research by 
Raman and Gelman (2005) has shown that individuals have a tendency of inferring that 
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permanent illnesses are inherited (i.e., having their etiology in genetics), while temporary 
illnesses are more likely to be seen as transmitted through contagion. It is unclear at this point 
whether mental illnesses are perceived differently from physical illnesses within this context, and 
future research could serve to clarify this point. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
 Given a general lack of support for the primary hypotheses of the present research, it is 
important to assess potential limitations stemming from the design and procedure of the present 
study. An important limiting factor in the present results is the limited sample size, which results 
in lower power and subsequently, a diminished ability to detect significant main and interaction 
effects. A further limitation associated with the sample size is the inability to perform factor 
analyses on the constructs of natural kinds and entitativity. Despite considerable disagreement on 
the necessary sample size required for adequate factor analyses (MacCallum, Widaman, Zhang, 
& Hong, 1999), even the most liberal recommendations suggest a minimum of 100 participants 
(Gorsuch, 1983). Although previous research has suggested that the two factors are indeed 
independent of one another (Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 2000; Haqanee, Lou, & Lalonde, 
2014), it may be necessary to demonstrate the same independence exists in the present 
population before assessing the changes in prejudice that occur following exposure to 
information that contradicts the belief of schizophrenia as an essentialized group. 
 Another potential limitation regarding the present research is the fact that all participants 
were recruited from a pool of students in introductory psychology courses. Participants were 
provided measures assessing the degree to which they stigmatized the mentally ill at two separate 
times, in the hopes that any changes in stigma were a result of the educational pamphlets 
provided at the second session. However, it is possible (and perhaps even likely) that participants 
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may have been exposed to information within the context of their psychology course(s) that also 
influenced the degree to which they endorsed stigmatizing attitudes. Furthermore, pre- and post-
intervention sessions were run two to three weeks apart in order to minimize any potential 
attempts by participants to reproduce the initial data from memory. Although this extended time 
period was considered necessary to minimize the influence of pre-intervention scores, it also 
inevitably leads to a greater likelihood that information that participants received from their 
courses could have been responsible for changes in their responses. Utilizing a more diverse 
subject pool (i.e., participants not currently enrolled in a psychology course) may eliminate this 
potential issue. 
 Similarly, participant demographics were geographically limited to individuals enrolled at 
a small-sized university located in eastern Kentucky. Recent epidemiological data published by 
the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA, 2014) suggests that 
the rate of serious mental illness (defined as “a disorder that substantially interfered with or 
limited one or more major life activities”) in Kentucky was somewhat higher than the rest of the 
country (4.74% in Kentucky, compared to 3.97% across the country). Although these data do not 
examine the incidence of schizophrenia specifically, it is plausible that the rates of schizophrenia 
may be somewhat higher in Kentucky. Given that considerable research has demonstrated that 
interpersonal contact is predictive of mental illness stigma (Couture & Penn, 2003), it is possible 
that residents of Kentucky may exhibit lower levels of prejudice toward the mentally ill than the 
national average. Further complicating this issue is the fact that participants in the present study 
were college-aged, limiting the generalizability of the results. Therefore, recruiting participants 
from across the country may elicit more readily generalizable findings. 
 A surprising finding regarding the present study is the unexpected degree in which the 
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control condition worked to decrease levels of stigma, compared to both the entitative and 
natural kinds conditions. Mean comparisons suggest that the control condition was more 
effective than both the entitative and natural kinds conditions at reducing perceptions of both the 
dangerousness and dependence of schizophrenic individuals. Retrospective analyses of the text 
of the control condition revealed that the control intervention listed information that could be 
construed as depicting individuals with schizophrenia as both not dangerous (i.e., more likely to 
be victims of violent behavior than to be violent themselves) and not necessarily dependent upon 
others (i.e., providing examples of accomplished individuals who were diagnosed with 
schizophrenia). Given this issue, it is unsurprising that participants who were exposed to this 
condition would be more likely to report decreases in endorsement of the beliefs that individuals 
with schizophrenia are dangerous or dependent upon others. Including a control intervention in 
future studies emphasizing a portrayal of schizophrenia as a medical illness like any other may 
provide compelling insight into the efficacy of altering essentialist beliefs compared to 
previously implemented stigma-reduction interventions. However, care should be taken to 
properly inform participants in the debriefing sessions that the information provided in the 
pamphlets may not be entirely accurate. 
 In a similar vein, the analyses conducted failed to identify the extent to which changes in 
both essentialist beliefs and stigmatic attitudes toward schizophrenia were a result of the 
differences in text of the pamphlet across conditions. In order to maintain internal validity and 
maximize consistency across conditions, the majority of the pamphlets were comprised of 
identical text that was designed to raise awareness about schizophrenia. Consequently, it could 
be argued that changes in participant beliefs may have been a result of this text, which may 
explain the present finding that reductions in both natural kinds and entitative beliefs occurred 
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independently of the condition to which participants were assigned. Accordingly, future research 
could explore the extent to which essentialist beliefs might subtly change after exposure to 
general educational information, rather than targeted interventions that explicitly seek to alter 
these beliefs. 
 Finally, the present study demonstrated that it is relatively easy to induce changes in 
essentialized beliefs via exposure to written educational pamphlets. However, it is unclear 
whether these belief changes are stable across time (i.e., would participants gradually revert back 
to pre-intervention levels of essentialized beliefs of schizophrenia?). Researchers may benefit 
from conducting longitudinal analyses in order to examine the long-lasting effects of correcting 
essentialized thinking, as well as assessing whether levels of stigma continue to be reduced as a 
result of these interventions. Further exploration within this area would be invaluable in 
providing further avenues of anti-stigma interventions, as well as gleaning a greater 
understanding into the malleability or rigidity of essentialist beliefs. 
Conclusions 
 The present study sought to extend the work of Haslam, Ernst, and Rothschild (2000, 
2002) and Haqanee, Lou, and Lalonde (2014) examining the role of essentialist beliefs in stigma, 
particularly towards severe mental illness. First, and consistent with predictions, essentialist 
beliefs about schizophrenia were found to be relatively easy to manipulate in the short-term via 
written informational pamphlets. However, the present study also showed changes in essentialist 
beliefs under conditions that were not hypothesized to elicit belief change. Therefore, it is 
currently unclear how general educational information may impact essentialized beliefs, and 
future research should seek to elucidate this relationship. Secondly, the present study 
demonstrated that there does seem to be a positive relationship between stigmatization of 
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schizophrenia and essentialized thinking, particularly within the natural kinds factor. This finding 
was inconsistent with previous research (Haslam, Ernst, & Rothschild, 2002; Haqanee, Lou, & 
Lalonde, 2014), which suggested that entitative beliefs were most strongly predictive of 
stigmatization of mental illness. However, this finding is consistent with Phelan (2005) and 
Phelan, Yang, and Cruz-Rojas (2006), who found that beliefs related to natural kinds beliefs (i.e., 
believing schizophrenia to be caused by biogenetic factors) are associated with stronger levels of 
prejudice. Furthermore, the present research provides evidence for the link between beliefs of the 
immutability of schizophrenia (itself a component of natural kinds beliefs) and the desire for 
social distance from individuals with schizophrenia. Trend level data was also found to support 
that perceived dangerousness of schizophrenia may also be related to the natural kinds factor of 
essentialist beliefs. Continued research should be conducted to identify the role in which both 
natural kinds and entitative beliefs play in the expression of stigma and prejudice towards 
individuals with mental illness, as well as elucidating the degree to which reductions in 
essentialized thinking are stable across time. 
  26 
References 
Ahn, W., Proctor, C.C., & Flanagan, E.H. (2009). Mental health clinicians' beliefs about the 
biological, psychological, and environmental bases of mental disorders. Cognitive 
Science, 33, 147-182. 
Albee, G.W., & Joffe, J.M. (2004). Mental illness is not “an illness like any other.” Journal of 
Primary Prevention, 24(4), 419-436. 
Allport, G. (1954). The nature of prejudice. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. 
American Psychiatric Association (1994). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders, 
4th ed. Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association. 
Angermeyer, M.C., & Dietrich, S. (2006). Public beliefs about and attitudes towards people with 
mental illness: a review of population studies. Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica, 113, 163-
179. 
Angermeyer, M.C., Holzinger, A., Carta, M.G., & Schomerus, G. (2011). Biogenetic explanations 
and public acceptance of mental illness: a systematic review of population studies. British 
Journal of Psychiatry, 199(5), 367-372. 
Angermeyer, M.C., & Matschinger, H. (2003). The stigma of mental illness: effects of labeling 
on public attitudes towards people with mental disorder. Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica, 
108, 304-309. 
Angermeyer, M.C., Matschinger, H., & Corrigan, P.W. (2004). Familiarity with mental illness 
and social distance from people with schizophrenia and major depression: testing a model 
using data from a representative population survey. Schizophrenia Research, 69, 1049-
1061. 
Becker, T., & Vazquez-Barquero, J.L. (2001). The European perspective of psychiatric reform. 
  27 
Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica, 104(Suppl. 410), 8-14. 
Bizer, G.Y., Hart, J., & Jekogian, A.M. (2012). Belief in a just world and social dominance 
orientation: Evidence for a meditational pathway predicting negative attitudes and 
discrimination against individuals with mental illness. Personality and Individual 
Differences, 52, 428-432. 
Bogardus, E.S. (1925). Measuring social distances. Journal of Applied Sociology, 9, 299-308. 
Campbell, D.T. (1958). Common fate, similarity and other indices of the status of aggregates of 
persons as social entities. Behavioral Science, 3, 14-25. 
Corrigan, P.W. (2007). How clinical diagnosis might exacerbate the stigma of mental illness. 
Social Work, 52(1), 31-39. 
Couture, S.M., & Penn, D.L. (2003). Interpersonal contact and the stigma of mental illness: A 
review of the literature. Journal of Mental Health, 12, 291-305. 
Crisp, A.H. (2000). Changing minds: Every family in the land. An update on the College's 
campaign. Psychiatric Bulletin, 24, 267-268. 
Crocker, J., & Quinn, D.M. (2003). Social stigma and the self: Meanings, situations, and self-
esteem. In T.F. Heatherton, R.E. Kleck, M.R. Hebl, & J.G. Hull (Eds.), The Social 
Psychology of Stigma (pp. 153-184). New York, NY: The Guilford Press. 
Cross, S. (2004). Visualizing madness: Mental illness and public representation. Television New 
Media, 5, 197-216. 
Crowne, D. P., & Marlowe, D. (1960). A new scale of social desirability independent of 
psychopathology. Journal of Consulting Psychology, 24, 349-354. 
Farina, A., & Felner, R.D. (1973). Employment interviewer reactions to former mental patients. 
Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 82(2), 268-272. 
  28 
Gil-White, F. J. (2001). Are ethnic groups biological “species” to the human brain? Essentialism 
in our conception of some social categories. Current Anthropology, 42, 515-554. 
Goffman, E. (1963). Stigma: Notes on the management of spoiled identity. Englewood Cliffs, 
N.J: Prentice-Hall. 
Gorsuch, R.L. (1983). Factor Analysis (2nd ed.). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Green, D., McCormick, I., Walkey, F., & Taylor, W. (1987). Community attitudes to mental 
illness in New Zealand twenty-two years on. Social Science & Medicine, 24, 417-422. 
Greene-Shortridge, T.M., Britt, T.W., & Castro, C.A. (2007). The stigma of mental health 
problems in the military. Military Medicine, 172, 157-161. 
Guze, S.B. (1992). Why psychiatry is a branch of medicine. New York: Oxford University Press 
Hammer, J.H., & Vogel, D.L. (2010). Men’s help seeking for depression: The efficacy of a male-
sensitive brochure about counseling. The Counseling Psychologist, 38, 296-313. 
Haqanee, Z., Lou, E., & Lalonde, R.N. (2014). Essentialist and entitative beliefs in relation to 
prejudice towards mental disorders. Journal of Applied Social Psychology. 
Haslam, N. (1998). Natural kinds, human kinds and essentialism. Social Research, 65, 291-314. 
Haslam, N. (2000) Psychiatric categories as natural kinds: Essentialist thinking about mental 
disorders. Social Research, 67, 1031-1058. 
Haslam, N. (2002). Essentialist beliefs about mental disorders. Journal of Social and Clinical 
Psychology, 21(6), 628-644. 
Haslam, N., Bastian, B., & Bissett, M. (2004). Essentialist beliefs about personality and their 
implications. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 30(12), 1661-1673. 
Haslam, N., & Ernst, D. (2002). Essentialist beliefs about mental disorders. Journal of Social 
and Clinical Psychology, 21(6), 628-644. 
  29 
Haslam, N., & Levy, S.R. (2006). Essentialist beliefs about homosexuality: Structure and 
implications for prejudice. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 32(4), 471-485. 
Haslam, N., Rothschild, L., & Ernst, D. (2000). Essentialist beliefs about social categories. 
British Journal of Social Psychology, 39, 113-127. 
Haslam, N., Rothschild, L., & Ernst, D. (2002). Are essentialist beliefs associated with 
prejudice? British Journal of Social Psychology, 41, 87-100. 
Hiday, V.A. (1995). The social context of mental illness and violence. Journal of Health and 
Social Behavior, 36(2), 122-137. 
Hinshaw, S.P. & Cicchetti, D. (2000). Stigma and mental disorder: Conceptions of illness, public 
attitudes, personal disclosure, and social policy. Development and Psychopathology, 12, 
555-598. 
Holmes, E.P., Corrigan, P.W., Williams, P., Canar, J., & Kubiak, M. (1999). Changing public 
attitudes about schizophrenia. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 25(3), 447-456. 
Huttner, B., Goossens, H., Verheij, T., & Harbarth, S. (2010). Characteristics and outcomes of 
public campaigns aimed at improving the use of antibiotics in outpatients in high-income 
countries. The Lancet Infectious Diseases, 10, 17-31. 
Jorm, A.F., & Oh, E. (2009). Desire for social distance from people with mental disorders: A 
review. Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry, 43, 183-200. 
Jorm, A.F., Koreten, A.E., Jacomb, P.A., Christensen, H., Rodgers, B., & Pollitt, P. (1997). Public 
beliefs about causes and risk factors for depression and schizophrenia. Social Psychiatry 
and Psychiatric Epidemiology, 32, 143-148. 
Laing, R.D. (1971). The politics of the family and other essays. London: Tavistock Publications. 
Lam, D.C.K., Salkovskis, P.M., & Warwick, H. (2005). An experimental investigation of the 
  30 
impact of biological versus psychological explanations of the cause of mental illness. 
Journal of Mental Health, 14, 453-464. 
Lincoln, T.M., Arens, E., Berger, C., & Rief, W. (2008). Can antistigma campaigns be improved? 
A test of the impact of biogenetic vs psychosocial causal explanations on implicit and 
explicit attitudes to schizophrenia. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 34(5), 984-994. 
Link, B.G. (1987). Understanding labeling effects in the area of mental disorders: An assessment 
of the effects of expectations of rejection. American Sociological Review, 52, 96-112. 
Link, B.G., Cullen, F.T., Frank, J., & Wozniak, J.F. (1987). The social rejection of former mental 
patients: Understanding why labels matter. American Journal of Sociology, 92, 1461-
1500. 
Link, B.G., Struening, E.L., Neese-Todd, S., Asmussen, S., & Phelan, J.C. (2001). Stigma as a 
barrier to recovery: The consequences of stigma for the self-esteem of people with mental 
illnesses. Psychiatric Services, 52, 1621-1626. 
Luchins, D. (2004). Will the term brain disease reduce stigma and promote parity for mental 
illnesses? Schizophrenia Bulletin, 30, 1043-1048. 
MacCallum, R.C., Widaman, K.F., Zhang, S., & Hong, S. (1999). Sample size in factor analysis. 
Psychological Methods 4, 84-99. 
Magli, E., Buizza, C., & Pioli, R. (2004). Mental illness and media. Recenti Progressi in 
Medicina, 95(6), 302-307. 
McGinty, E.E., Webster, D.W., & Barry, C.L. (2013). Effects of news media messages about 
mass shootings on attitudes toward persons with serious mental illness and public support 
for gun control policies. American Journal of Psychiatry, 170, 494-501. 
Morrison, J.K., Cocozza, J.J., & Vanderwyst, D. (1980). An attempt to change the negative, 
  31 
stigmatizing image of mental patients through brief reeducation. Psychological Reports, 
47(1), 334. 
Penn, D.L., Kommana, S., Mansfield, M., & Link, B.G. (1999). Dispelling the stigma of 
schizophrenia: II. The impact of information on dangerousness. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 
25(3), 437-446. 
Pescosolido, B.A., Martin, J.K., Long, J.S., Medina, T.R., Phelan, J.C., & Link, B.G. (2010). “A 
disease like any other”? A decade of change in public reactions to schizophrenia, 
depression, and alcohol dependence. American Journal of Psychiatry, 167, 1321-1330. 
Phelan, J.C. (2005). Geneticization of deviant behavior and consequences for stigma: The case of 
mental illness. Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 46, 307-322. 
Phelan, J.C., Yang, L.H., & Cruz-Rojas, R. (2006). Effects of attributing serious mental illnesses 
to genetic causes on orientations to treatment. Psychiatric Services, 57, 382-387. 
Pratto, F., Sidanius, J., Stallworth, L.M., & Malle, B.F. (1994). Social dominance orientation: A 
personality variable predicting social and political attitudes. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 67, 741-763. 
Raman, L., & Gelman, S. A. (2005). Children’s understanding of the transmission of genetic 
disorders and contagious illnesses. Developmental Psychology, 41(1), 171-182. 
Read, J., Haslam, J., Sayce, L., & Davies, E. (2006). Prejudice and schizophrenia: a review of the 
'mental illness is an illness like any other' approach. Acta Psychiatrica, Scandinavica, 
114, 303-318. 
Read, J., Law, A. (1999). The relationship of causal beliefs and contact with users of mental 
health services to attitudes to the “mentally ill.” International Journal of Social 
Psychiatry, 45, 216-229. 
  32 
Ritsher, J.B., Otilingam, P.G., & Grajales, M. (2003). Internalized stigma of mental illness: 
Psychometric properties of a new measure. Psychiatry Research, 121, 31-49. 
Rothbart, M., & Taylor, M. (1992). Category labels and social reality: Do we view social 
categories as natural kinds? In G. Semin & F. Fiedler (Eds.), Language, interaction, and 
social cognition (pp. 11-36). London: Sage. 
Rusch, N., Angermeyer, M.C., & Corrigan, P.W. (2005). Mental illness stigma: Concepts, 
consequences, and initiatives to reduce stigma. European Psychiatry, 20, 529-539. 
Sartorius, N. (1997). Fighting schizophrenia and stigma: a new WPA educational program. 
British Journal of Psychiatry, 170, 297. 
Schnitker, J. (2008). An uncertain revolution: Why the rise of a genetic model of mental illness 
has not increased tolerance. Social Science & Medicine, 67, 1370-1381. 
Schomerus, G., Schwahn, C., Holzinger, A., Corrigan, P.W., Grabe, H.J., Carta, M.G., & 
Angermeyer, M.C. (2012). Evolution of public attitudes about mental illness: a 
systematic review and meta-analysis. Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica, 125, 440-452. 
Sibitz, I., Amerin, M., Unger, A., Seyringer, M.E., Bachmann, A., Schrank, B., Benesch, T., 
Schulze, B., & Woppmann, A. (2011). The impact of the social network, stigma and 
empowerment on the quality of life in patients with schizophrenia. European Psychiatry, 
26(1), 28-33. 
Simmons, J.P., Nelson, L.D., & Simonsohn, U. (2011). False-positive psychology: Undisclosed 
flexibility in data collection and analysis allows presenting anything as significant. 
Psychological Science, 22, 1359-1366. 
Sirey, J.A., Bruce, M.L., Alexopoulos, G.S., Perlick, D.A., Friedman, S.J., & Meyers, B.S. 
(2001). Stigma as a barrier to recovery: Perceived stigma and patient-rated severity of 
  33 
illness as predictors of antidepressant drug adherence. Psychiatric Services, 52, 1615-
1620. 
Stuart, H. (2006). Media portrayal of mental illness and its treatments. CNS Drugs, 20(2), 99-
106. 
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, Center for Behavioral Health 
Statistics and Quality. (February 28, 2014). The NSDUH Report: State Estimates of Adult 
Mental Illness from the 2011 and 2012 National Surveys on Drug Use and Health. 
Rockville, MD. Retrieved from http://www.samhsa.gov/data/2k14/NSDUH170/sr170-
mental-illness-state-estimates-2014.htm 
Thornton, J.A., & Wahl, O.F. (1996). Impact of a newspaper article on attitudes toward mental 
illness. Journal of Community Psychology, 24, 17-25. 
Trute, B., Tefft, B., & Segall, A. (1989). Social rejection of the mentally ill: a replication study of 
public attitude. Social Psychiatry and Psychiatric Epidemiology, 24, 69-76. 
Verkuyten, M. (2003). Discourses about ethnic group (de-)essentialism: Oppressive and 
progressive aspects. British Journal of Social Psychology, 42, 371-391. 
Weiner, B., Perry, R.P., & Magnusson, J. (1988). An attributional analysis of reactions to stigmas. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 55(5), 738-748. 
Weiten, W., Dunn, D.S., & Hammer, E.Y. (2012). Psychology applied to modern life: Adjustment 
in the 21st century (10th ed.). Belmont, CA: Wadworth, Cengage Learning. 
  34 
Table 1 
Mean and SD Values of Manipulation Check Variables as a Function of Assigned Condition and 
Time 
  Entitativity Natural Kinds 
Condition Time M SD M SD 
Entitativity Pre 2.70 0.78 3.42 1.17 
 Post 1.91 0.84 3.21 1.27 
Natural Kinds Pre 2.46 0.77 3.10 1.14 
 Post 2.08 0.62 2.43 1.21 
Control Pre 2.64 0.79 3.62 1.12 
 Post 2.20 0.63 3.71 0.90 
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Figure 1. Social Distance scores as a function of time and assigned intervention condition. 
aSocial distance scores averaged across intervention conditions significantly decreased following the intervention, ,  
p < .005. 
a              a 
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Figure 2. Dangerousness scores as a function of time and assigned intervention condition. 
a  Participants assigned to the natural kinds condition exhibited a significant reduction in desire for social distance,   
p < .01. 
b  Participants assigned to the control condition exhibited a significant reduction in desire for social distance,             
p < .001. 
a                   b 
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Figure 3. Dependence scores as a function of time and assigned intervention condition. 
aDependence scores averaged across intervention conditions significantly decreased following the intervention,        
p < .05. 
a                 a 
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Appendix A 
Department of Psychology 
Morehead State University 
Morehead, KY 
(606) 783-2981 
INFORMED CONSENT STATEMENT: 
“Ratings on the Effectiveness of a Mental Illness Informational Pamphlet” 
 
This research is being conducted by David A. Butz and Fredrick T. Chin, researchers in the 
Psychology department at Morehead State University. You must be at least 18 years of age in 
order to participate. The present study is an investigation of social attitudes towards a variety of 
interpersonal issues.  
Participation in this study involves answering questions about yourself and your beliefs, and 
rating the effectiveness of mental illness pamphlets intended for distribution at the Morehead 
Counseling . The study is composed of two parts – you will be asked to return in 2 weeks to 
complete the second part. The first part will take approximately 15-30 minutes, and the second 
will take approximately 30-45 minutes.. We are interested in your honest attitudes and opinions. 
If you have any questions about how to complete the surveys, you may ask the student assistant 
in this project. This survey is to be taken at your own pace and individually. Please do not take 
this survey with anyone else in close proximity. Your responses on the survey will be completely 
anonymous. Please be as open and honest about the answers as you can while taking the survey. 
If you have any questions or comments after completion of the study, you may contact the 
principal investigator, Fredrick Chin, at ftchin@moreheadstate.edu 
 
Your participation is totally voluntary and you may stop participation at any time. You are free 
not to answer specific items or questions, or to complete any part of the survey. You will receive 
2 (two) research credits for your participation in this survey. You may stop participation at any 
point during the survey without penalty. You may choose to do something else for credit in your 
psychology class in consultation with your instructor. 
 
Your responses today will remain confidential to the extent allowed by law. Aside from the 
investigators for this project, no one will have access to your questionnaire. Additionally, to 
ensure anonymity, please do not put your name or other identifying information anywhere on the 
questionnaire. Your informed consent form will be kept separately from the completed 
questionnaire, and your name will never be linked with your responses. Any reports generated 
will only use group averages, rather than individual cases. 
 
We are required by law to report to the proper authorities any information that a person under the 
age of 18 is being abused or neglected by a family member, and/or that physical abuse has 
occurred between married persons. Aside from those cases, only members of the research team 
will have access to your responses. While data are being collected, data will be kept on a secure 
website. Upon completion of this study, data will be transferred to laboratory computers at 
Morehead State University and will only be able to be accessed by members of the research 
team.  
 
This study has been reviewed by the Institutional Review Board at Morehead State University 
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and has been deemed to pose little or no threat to participants. There appear to be minimal risks 
or discomfort associated with completing any part of the study. The guidelines for protecting the 
rights of human subjects that are in operation in this study may be found on the university web 
site: http://www2.moreheadstate.edu/irb/  
 
Questions or concerns regarding your protection and rights as a participant in this study can be 
referred to Shannon Harr, Director of Research Integrity and Compliance in the Office of 
Research and Sponsored Programs at Morehead State University, at (606) 783-2307. If you feel 
discomfort because of your participation in the study, you are encouraged to contact Dr. David 
Butz at (606) 783-2313, the MSU Counseling and Health Services Center (112 Allie Young) at 
(606) 783-2123, or Pathways, Inc. in Morehead at (606) 784-4161. Any other questions 
regarding the study can be referred to the principal investigator, Fredrick Chin, at (606) 356-
1155. 
 
****************************************************************************** 
Request for signature: Please sign below to signify that you consent to participate in this project. 
All participants in this study must be 18 years of age or older. Your signature below certifies 
that you meet this requirement. 
 
I have read and understand the above statement and give my voluntary consent for participation 
in the study entitled “Ratings on the Effectiveness of a Mental Illness Informational 
Pamphlet” (Please sign below.) 
 
________________________________ 
Print Name    
 
____________________________________ 
Signature      
 
______________________ 
Date 
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APPENDIX B 
Demographics 
 
General Instructions: The following section contains items assessing basic demographic 
information 
 
Age: ________  Gender (check one): ___ Female   ___ Male    
 
Year in College (check one):  
___ Freshman   ___ Sophomore   ___ Junior 
___ Senior    ___ Other (please elaborate) ___________________ 
 
Birthplace and Nationality: I was (fill in one): 
Born in the U.S. in (town) ______________________ , (state) ______ 
Born in another country (Please list country) ______________________ 
If you were born in another country, how many years have you lived in the U.S.? ________ 
 
Religious Group Membership (check one): 
___ Protestant  ___ Catholic  ___ Muslim   ___ Jewish 
___ Buddhist  ___ Agnostic  ___ Atheist 
___ Other (please specify) _________________________________              
 
How strongly do you identify yourself as a member of the religious group you checked 
above? 
 
NOT AT ALL  1         2         3         4         5         6         7      VERY MUCH 
 
How would you classify your political ideology? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
very       liberal         slightly        middle of        slightly          conservative         very  liberal             
liberal          the road      conservative                        conservative 
 
 
How would you classify your political party affiliation? 
 
_____ Democratic  _____ Republican  _____ Other 
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APPENDIX C 
Schizophrenia Information 
 
Schizophrenia is a disorder marked by disturbances in thought that spill over to affect perceptual, 
social, and emotional processes.  This disorder is marked by cognitive deficits and disturbed 
thought processes that often lead to various delusions, such as the belief that one's thoughts are 
being broadcast to the government.  Schizophrenics also often suffer from hallucinations, 
perceiving things that aren't there.  For example, many schizophrenics complain of hearing 
voices in their heads, or seeing famous people in their homes.  Schizophrenia may also disrupt 
emotional expression.  Some sufferers show very little emotion, while others may show 
inappropriate emotions that are inconsistent with the situation or what they are saying.  Despite 
popular misconception, this disorder should not be confused with multiple personality disorder. 
 
The following is a quote from an individual with schizophrenia: 
 
“I'm pregnant with the song of God. I work for Epic Records. I'm Joan of Arc. I'm Florence 
Nightingale. The door between the ward and the porch is the dividing line between New York and 
California. Divorce isn't a piece of paper, it's a feeling. Forget about Zip Codes.” 
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APPENDIX D 
Essentialist Beliefs/Manipulations Check 
 
There are many people in the community who exhibit schizophrenic behaviors.  The next 
few questions are about the nature of these sorts of problems.  There are no right or wrong 
answers to these questions.  Rather, you may have to reflect on your intuitions and prior 
experiences, or “go with your gut.” 
 
* Biological Basis (natural kinds) 
Schizophrenia is caused by biological factors such as genes and hormones. 
Very strongly disagree  1 2 3 4 5 Very strongly agree 
 
* Immutability (natural kinds) 
A schizophrenic individual can become mentally healthy or completely cured. (R) 
Very strongly disagree  1 2 3 4 5 Very strongly agree 
 
* Discreteness (natural kinds) 
Schizophrenia is a category with clear and sharp boundaries: people are either mentally ill, 
or they are mentally healthy. 
Very strongly disagree  1 2 3 4 5 Very strongly agree 
 
Fixity (natural kinds) 
Whether or not a person will become schizophrenic is pretty much set early on in 
childhood. 
Very strongly disagree  1 2 3 4 5 Very strongly agree 
 
Defining Features (natural kinds) 
Schizophrenic individuals have necessary or defining characteristics, without which they 
would not be mentally ill. 
Very strongly disagree  1 2 3 4 5 Very strongly agree 
 
Historical Invariance (natural kinds) 
Schizophrenia has probably existed throughout history. 
Very strongly disagree  1 2 3 4 5 Very strongly agree 
 
Universality (natural kinds) 
Schizophrenia probably only exists in certain cultures. (R) 
Very strongly disagree  1 2 3 4 5 Very strongly agree 
 
* Informativeness (entitativity) 
Schizophrenia is an informative disorder, so that knowing someone has schizophrenia tells 
us a lot about the person. 
Very strongly disagree  1 2 3 4 5 Very strongly agree 
 
* Uniformity (entitativity) 
Schizophrenia is a relatively uniform disorder, so that people with schizophrenia are very 
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similar to one another. 
Very strongly disagree  1 2 3 4 5 Very strongly agree 
 
* Exclusivity (entitativity) 
Schizophrenia is a category that is exclusive; such a category does not allow a person to 
belong to other categories. 
Very strongly disagree  1 2 3 4 5 Very strongly agree 
 
Inherence (entitativity) 
Schizophrenia is a disorder that has an underlying reality, so behind their symptoms, 
schizophrenics are inherently the same. 
Very strongly disagree  1 2 3 4 5 Very strongly agree 
 
* Violence (control) 
People with schizophrenia are often violent, and therefore present a danger to society. 
Very strongly disagree  1 2 3 4 5 Very strongly agree 
 
* Drugs (control) 
People with schizophrenia use illegal drugs to escape their problems. 
Very strongly disagree  1 2 3 4 5 Very strongly agree 
 
* Societal burden (control) 
People with schizophrenia are unable to make meaningful contributions to society. 
Very strongly disagree  1 2 3 4 5 Very strongly agree 
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APPENDIX E 
Social Distance Scale 
 
Please indicate your reaction to each of the following statements by circling the number 
that most closely corresponds to your opinion about individuals with schizophrenia. 
 
  1 In no case at all 
  2 Probably not, but I would think about it 
  3 I do not feel strongly one way or another about it 
  4 I probably would, but may have some reservations 
  5 In any case 
 
In no case         In any 
    at all          case 
 
1   2   3   4   5 How would you feel about renting a room in your home to an 
individual with schizophrenia? 
 
1   2   3   4   5 How would you feel about having a schizophrenic as a co-worker? 
 
1   2   3   4   5 How would you feel about having a schizophrenic as a neighbor? 
 
1   2   3   4   5 How would you feel about having a schizophrenic as the caretaker of 
your children for a couple hours? 
 
1   2   3   4   5 How would you feel about having your son or daughter marrying a 
schizophrenic? 
 
1   2   3   4   5 How would you feel about introducing someone with schizophrenia to 
a young woman you are friendly with? 
 
1   2   3   4   5  How would you feel about recommending someone with  
 schizophrenia for a job working for a friend of yours? 
 
1   2   3   4   5  How would you feel about working on a group project for a  
 class with someone who has schizophrenia? 
 
1   2   3   4   5 How would you feel about sharing a dorm room or apartment with 
someone who has schizophrenia? 
 
1   2   3   4   5 How would you feel about being in a long-term relationship someone 
with schizophrenia? 
 
1   2   3   4   5 How would you feel about attending a party or social gathering if you 
know someone with schizophrenia will be there? 
 
1   2   3   4   5 How would you feel about sitting next to someone with schizophrenia 
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in one of your classes? 
 
1   2   3   4   5 How would you feel about going on a date with someone with 
schizophrenia? 
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APPENDIX F 
Perceptions of Dangerousness/Dependency 
 
Please indicate to what extent you feel the following attributes apply to individuals with 
schizophrenia by circling the number that most closely corresponds with your opinion: 
 
Schizophrenic individuals come across to me as: 
 
Dangerous 
Definitely not true 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Definitely true 
Aggressive 
Definitely not true 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Definitely true 
Lacking self-control 
Definitely not true 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Definitely true 
Unpredictable 
Definitely not true 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Definitely true 
Frightening 
Definitely not true 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Definitely true 
Dependent upon others 
Definitely not true 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Definitely true 
Helpless 
Definitely not true 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Definitely true 
Needy 
Definitely not true 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  Definitely true 
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APPENDIX G 
Causal Attributions 
 
There are many people in the community who suffer from schizophrenia.  How likely do 
you think each of the following is to be a reason for such problems?  Circle the number that 
most closely matches your opinion. 
 
            Neither/ 
 Very Unlikely    Unlikely   Don’t Know    Likely     Very Likely 
 
A virus or other type of infection  
   1  2  3  4  5 
 
An allergy or reaction 
   1  2  3  4  5 
 
Day-to-day problems such as stress, 
family arguments, or financial difficulties  
   1  2  3  4  5 
 
The recent death of a close  
friend or relative  
   1  2  3  4  5 
  
Some recent traumatic event such as 
fires threatening your home, a severe  
traffic accident, or being mugged  
   1  2  3  4  5 
 
Problems from childhood such as being 
badly treated or abused, or losing one or   
both parents when young 
   1  2  3  4  5 
  
Genetics or inherited (i.e. you’re 
“born” susceptible to these problems)   
   1  2  3  4  5 
 
Being a nervous person  
   1  2  3  4  5 
 
Having weakness of character 
   1  2  3  4  5 
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APPENDIX H 
Anti-stigma intervention 
 
Natural Kinds Belief Intervention 
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Entitative Beliefs Intervention 
  50 
 
Control Intervention 
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Reverse side for all intervention conditions Natural Kinds Belief Intervention 
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APPENDIX I 
Pamphlet Ratings 
 
We'd like your feedback on the informational pamphlet you just read. Please respond to 
the following items as honestly as possible, to the best of your abilities. 
 
How well-written was the pamphlet? 
 
Not well written 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very well written 
 
 
How well-designed was the pamphlet? 
 
Not well designed 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very well designed 
 
 
How much did you learn about schizophrenia from reading the pamphlet? 
 
Nothing at all  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 A lot 
 
 
How likely would you be to recommend the pamphlet to someone who had a family 
member with schizophrenia? 
 
Not very likely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very likely 
 
 
Please write any additional comments you have about the pamphlet in the space provided. 
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APPENDIX J 
Social Dominance Orientation 
 
Which of the following objects or statements do you have a positive or negative feeling 
towards? Beside each statement, place a number from '1' to '7' which represent the degree 
of your positive or negative feeling. 
 
  1 VERY NEGATIVE 
  2 NEGATIVE 
  3 SLIGHTLY NEGATIVE 
  4 NEITHER POSITIVE NOR NEGATIVE 
  5 SLIGHTLY POSITIVE 
  6 POSITIVE 
  7 VERY POSITIVE 
 
 
_____ Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups 
 
_____ In getting what you want, it is sometimes necessary to use force against other groups. 
 
_____ It's OK if some groups have more of a chance in life than others. 
 
_____ To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups. 
 
_____ If certain groups stayed in their place, we would have fewer problems. 
 
_____ It's probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at the 
bottom. 
 
_____ Inferior groups should stay in their place. 
 
_____ Sometimes other groups must be kept in their place. 
 
_____ It would be good if groups could be equal. (R) 
 
_____ Group equality should be our ideal. (R) 
 
_____ All groups should be given an equal chance in life.  (R) 
 
_____ We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups. (R) 
 
_____ We would have fewer problems if we treated people more equally. (R) 
 
_____ We should strive to make incomes as equal as possible. (R) 
 
_____ No one group should dominate in society. (R) 
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APPENDIX K 
Crowne-Marlowe Social Desirability 
 
Listed below are a number of statements concerning personal attitudes and traits. Read 
each item and decide whether the statement is true or false as it pertains to you personally. 
 
1. Before voting I thoroughly investigate the qualifications of all the candidates. 
2. I never hesitate to go out of my way to help someone in trouble. 
3. It is sometimes hard for me to go on with my work if I am not encouraged. 
4. I have never intensely disliked anyone. 
5. On occasion I have had doubts about my ability to succeed in life. 
6. I sometimes feel resentful when I don't get my way. 
7. I am always careful about my manner of dress. 
8. My table manners at home are as good as when I eat out in a restaurant. 
9. If I could get into a movie without paying and be sure I was not seen I would probably do 
it. 
10. On a few occasions, I have given up doing something because I thought too little of my 
ability. 
11. I like to gossip at times. 
12. There have been times when I felt like rebelling against people in authority even though I 
knew they were right.  
13. No matter who I'm talking to, I'm always a good listener. 
14. I can remember “playing sick” to get out of something. 
15. There have been occasions when I took advantage of someone. 
16. I'm always willing to admit it when I make a mistake. 
17. I always try to practice what I preach. 
  55 
18. I don't find it particularly difficult to get along with loud mouthed, obnoxious people. 
19. I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget. 
20. When I don't know something I don't at all mind admitting it. 
21. I am always courteous, even to people who are disagreeable. 
22. At times I have really insisted on having things my own way.  
23. There have been occasions when I felt like smashing things. 
24. I would never think of letting someone else be punished for my wrong-doings. 
25. I never resent being asked to return a favor.  
26. I have never been irked when people expressed ideas very different from my own.  
27. I never make a long trip without checking the safety of my car.  
28. There have been times when I was quite jealous of the good fortune of others.  
29. I have almost never felt the urge to tell someone off.  
30. I am sometimes irritated by people who ask favors of me.  
31. I have never felt that I was punished without cause.  
32. I sometimes think when people have a misfortune they only got what they deserved.  
33. I have never deliberately said something that hurt someone's feelings.  
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Appendix L 
Debriefing:  
 
Thank you for your participation in this research. The purpose of this study, in short, was to see 
how effective various anti-stigma interventions were at lowering prejudicial attitudes towards 
schizophrenia.   The general trend of anti-stigma interventions in recent years has been to focus 
on conceptualizing mental illness as a disease just like any other. However, there is evidence to 
suggest that rather than lowering stigma and prejudice toward mental illness, these interventions 
may have served to increase overall levels of stigma. 
 
In the current study, we attempted to modify a different set of beliefs, known as “essentialist 
beliefs,” through anti-stigma pamphlets. We hope to find that altering these sets of beliefs are 
effective at lowering stigma, and to find support for the hypothesis that these interventions are a 
better alternative to the current “illness just like any other” model. 
 
In this study, we deceived you by leading you to believe that the pamphlets were intended for 
distribution at the MSU Counseling Center. This was deemed necessary, as people often (and 
sometimes unconsciously) disguise and minimize their negative opinions of others. This 
phenomenon is known as “social desirability” in the field of psychology. It is important to note 
here that all information in the pamphlets themselves, as well as in the educational schizophrenia 
page that you received, is accurate and reliable. 
 
In order for the results of this study to be valid, it is extremely important that future participants 
not be aware of the nature of the study.  Therefore, we ask that you please do not discuss this 
study with any of your classmates who may participate in the future.  If you have questions 
right now, please ask.  
 
We greatly appreciate your participation in this study.  If you should have any questions about 
the procedures or comments on the study, you may contact Dr. David A. Butz, Morehead State 
University (d.butz@moreheadstate.edu) or Fredrick Chin (ftchin@moreheadstate.edu) for 
answers to questions about this research or your rights.  If you feel discomfort because of your 
participation in the study, you are encouraged to contact Dr. David Butz, the MSU Counseling 
and Health Services Center (606) 783-2123, or Pathways, Inc. (606) 784-4161. 
 
To learn more about the problems with current anti-stigma campaigns, you may consult:  
 
Lincoln, T.M., Arens, E., Berger, C., & Rief, W. (2008).  Can antistigma campaigns be 
improved? A test of the impact of biogenetic vs psychosocial causal explanations on implicit 
and explicit attitudes to schizophrenia. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 34(5), 984-994. 
 
